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Does the Collapsing Principle
Rule Out Borderline Cases?
Johan E. Gustafsson∗
If ‘F’ is a predicate, then ‘Fer than’ or ‘more F than’ is a correspond-
ing comparative relational predicate. Concerning such comparative re-
lations, John Broome’s Collapsing Principle states that, for any x and
y, if it is false that y is Fer than x and not false that x is Fer than y,
then it is true that x is Fer than y. Luke Elson has recently put forward
two alleged counter-examples to this principle, allegedly showing that it
yields contradictions if there are borderline cases. In this paper, I argue
that the Collapsing Principle does not rule out borderline cases, but I
also argue that it is implausible.
For two decades, John Broome has defended the Collapsing Principle as
a principle of logic for comparative relations. Here, a comparative relation
should be understood in a technical, linguistic sense. Broome explains:
Take any monadic predicate such ‘dangerous’ or ‘sunny in the
morning’. For generality, designate it with the schematic letter ‘F’.
We can oen form from F a dyadic predicate, or relation, desig-
nated by ‘more F than’. For example, we form ‘more dangerous than’
and ‘more sunny in the morning than’. Call this the ‘comparative
relation’ of F. In English, when ‘F’ is a short adjective, ‘more F
than’ generally has the synonym ‘Fer than’. Irregularly, ‘more good
than’ has the synonym ‘better than’.1
TheCollapsing Principle concerns cases where it is indeterminatewhether
a comparative relation holds between some items—that is, cases where it’s
neither true nor false that the relation holds between the items. Broome
states the principle as follows:
∗ I would be grateful for any thoughts or comments on this paper, which can be sent
to me at johan.eric.gustafsson@gmail.com.
1 John BroomeWeighing Lives (Oxford, 2004), at p. 50. Broome writes as if there
is a unique comparative relation of F. Yet there are two: one for superiority in Fness,
formed by ‘more F than’; and one for inferiority in Fness, formed by ‘less F than’—see
Rodney Huddleston and Georey K. Pullum, The Cambridge Grammar of the English
Language (Cambridge, 2002), p. 1100. While we shall focus on superiority comparatives,
the discussion will also apply to inferiority comparatives, changing what needs to be
changed. Perhaps Broome meant that there’s only one relation R here, designated by
both ‘more F ’ and ‘less F’ so that R holds between items x and y if and only if ‘x is more
F than y’ is true if and only if ‘y is less F than x’ is true. (I thank Krister Bykvist for this
suggestion.)
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The Collapsing Principle
For any x and y, if it is false that y is Fer than x and not false that
x is Fer than y, then it is true that x is Fer than y.2
Luke Elson has recently put forward two alleged counter-examples to the
Collapsing Principle. Elson claims that, if there are borderline cases, the
Collapsing Principle entails contradictions.
In this paper, I shall defend two claims. Against Elson, I shall argue
that
(1) The Collapsing Principle need not entail contradictions if there are
borderline cases.
But, against Broome, I shall still argue that
(2) The Collapsing Principle is somewhat implausible.
One might question the importance of (1) given (2). Yet, even if (2) is true,
(1) matters for one of the central issues in ethical theory: The Collapsing
Principle is the main premise of Broome’s argument against value incom-
parability. Broome argues that value incomparability rules out vagueness
in the betterness relation; and, since there is vagueness in the betterness
relation, there is no value incomparability.3 If, however, the Collapsing
Principle rules out borderline cases by itself, it would assume the point
at issue in Broome’s argument, making it a non-starter. On the other
hand, given (1) and (2), Broome’s argument might still have some lim-
ited cogency. In addition, even if the Collapsing Principle and Broome’s
argument are both invalid, we should try to nd out why.
1. ‘Settaller Than’
Although Elson presents his alleged counter-examples to the Collapsing
Principle as two versions of the same basic example, these examples dier
somewhat in their structure. Hence we shall discuss them separately.
For the rst example, Elson asks us to consider a comparative predicate,
dened as follows:
2 This is Broome’s ‘special version’ (‘Is Incommensurability Vagueness?’, ed. R. Chang,
Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason (Cambridge, MA, 1997),
pp. 67–89, at p. 74); his ‘general version’ is stated in terms of degrees of truth (‘In-
commensurability’, p. 77). Elsewhere, he states a somewhat dierent versions of the
principle; see J. Broome,Weighing Lives (Oxford, 2004), p. 174 and ‘Reply to Rabinow-
icz’, Philosophical Issues 19 (2009), pp. 412–17, at p. 416. The dierences between these
versions, however, won’t be crucial for our discussion. Broome, ‘Incommensurability’,
pp. 74–75, also provides some arguments for the Collapsing Principle; see, however,
Johan E. Gustafsson, ‘Indeterminacy and the Small-Improvement Argument’, Utilitas 25
(2013), pp. 433–445, at pp. 437–438, for some objections to these arguments.
3 Broome, ’Incommensurability’, pp. 73–74.
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(3) Set X is settaller than set Y =df set X contains more tall men than
set Y .4
Given this new predicate, compare the following sets:
A, which contains ten tall men and nothing else,
B, which contains ten tall men, one borderline tall man (call him
‘Tallish’), and nothing else, and
C, which contains eleven tall men and nothing else.
Since B contains at least as many men as A, it is false that A is settaller
than B. And, since it’s indeterminate whether B contains ten or eleven
tall men, it’s not false that B contains more tall men than A and thus not
false that B is settaller than A. Then, according to Elson, the Collapsing
Principle yields that B is settaller than A. And, if it’s true that B is settaller
than A, it follows by (3) that it’s true that B contains more tall men than A.
So it must be true that Tallish is a tall man.5
We then apply the same kind of reasoning to the comparison of B
and C. Since C contains at least as many tall men as B, it’s false that B
is settaller than C. And, since it’s indeterminate whether B contains ten
or eleven men, it’s not false that C contains more tall men than B and
thus not false that C is settaller than B. Then, according to Elson, the
Collapsing Principle yields that C is settaller than B. And, if it’s true that
C is settaller than B, it follows by (3) that it’s true that C contains more tall
men than B. So it must be false that Tallish is a tall man, which contradicts
the earlier claim that it’s true that Tallish is a tall man. The upshot of
Elson’s argument is that, if there are borderline cases like Tallish, the
Collapsing Principle yields contradictions.6
Elson addresses the worry that ‘settaller than’ is too articial to be a
compelling counter-example to the Collapsing Principle. He writes
Is the predicate ‘is settaller than’ objectionably articial? This is
not a promising line of objection. First, the predicate is not all that
outré: there is nothing special about counting the number of tall
men in various sets. Moreover, the collapsing principle is intended
to be fully general, and not limited to natural-language plausible
predicates.7
4 Luke Elson, ‘Borderline Cases and the Collapsing Principle’, Utilitas 26 (2014),
pp. 51–60, at p. 55.
5 Elson, ‘Borderline Cases’, p. 55. This conclusion seems to conict with the original
assumption that Tallish ismerely a borderline tallman. If we already have a contradiction,
then the second half of the example is superuous. It makes no dierence for my
objections whether we adopt this shorter version of the example or the longer one,
because my objections apply to the rst half of the example.
6 Elson, ‘Borderline Cases’, p. 55.
7 Elson, ‘Borderline Cases’, p. 56.
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I shall argue, however, that the problem with ‘settaller than’ is not that it
is an articial comparative; the problem is that it is not a comparative.
Remember that comparative relations in Broome’s sense are formed
by modifying a monadic predicate F by a marker of comparative grade,
such as ‘more F than’ or ‘Fer than’. Elson’s ‘settaller than’ ends in ‘-er
than’, but there doesn’t seem to be any monadic predicate ‘settall’ of which
‘settaller than’ is a comparative. The logical form of ‘contains more tall
men than’ does not match that of a comparative relation. First, it is of the
form ‘contains more F than’ rather than ‘more F than’.8 Second, the F that
is modied by ‘more’ is not a predicate but a plural noun phrase—‘more’
in ‘contains more tall men than’ modies ‘tall men’ and not just ‘tall’. So
‘more’ is used here in the sense ‘a greater number of ’ rather than as a
marker of comparative grade. It is a conation between these two senses
of ‘more’ that drives the example: When we learn that B is settaller than A,
we learn by (3) that B contains a greater number of tall men than A, rather
than that B is more settall than A (whatever that might mean).
Even though ‘settaller than’ is a dyadic relation that involves a compar-
ison between its relata, it’s not a comparative relation.9 And, if so, it’s not
a counter-example to the Collapsing Principle, which is only put forward
as a principle of logic for comparative relations. This is not an ad hoc
restriction. Whether a dyadic relation is a comparative or just a relation
8 Compare Moore’s objection to Brentano’s tting-attitude analysis of ‘good’ and of
‘better’ in G. E. Moore, ‘Review of Franz Brentano, The Origin of the Knowledge of Right
and Wrong’, The International Journal of Ethics 14 (1903), pp. 115–123, at p. 118:
His rst suggestion is that since “good” means “worthy to be loved,” “bet-
ter” must mean “worthy of more love”. . . . It does not seem to have oc-
curred to him that it must mean “more worthy of love,” . . .
If ‘better than’ is a comparative (which it seems to be), then the same objection should
also rule out contemporary versions of Brentano’s approach, such as those by JoshuaGert,
‘Value and Parity’, Ethics 114 (2004), pp. 492–510, at p. 505, or Wlodek Rabinowicz, ‘Value
Relations’, Theoria 74 (2008), pp. 18–49, at p. 38. They both dene that ‘x is better than y’
as ‘it is rationally required that x is preferred to y’. Their deniendum is a comparative
but their deniens lacks the structure of a comparative.
9 This point also applies to Chang’s alleged counter-example based on the relation
‘much heavier than’, which is of the form ‘much Fer than’ rather than ‘Fer than’. A
comparative ‘Fer than’ holds if the rst relata has a higher degree of Fness than the
second relata; Ruth Chang,Making Comparisons Count (London, 2002), p. 166. The
relation ‘much Fer than’, on the other hand, does not have this kind of structure; it holds
when the rst relata has a much higher degree of Fness than the second relata. In ‘much
Fer than’, ‘much’ modies the comparative ‘Fer than’; it is not itself part of a comparative.
To see this, note that comparatives in English can be modied by ‘much’, ‘far’, ‘somewhat’,
‘slightly’, and other modiers; see Huddleston and Pullum, The Cambridge Grammar,
p. 1131. For example, Smith is somewhat heavier than Jones is grammatical; but *Smith is
somewhat much heavier than Jones is not. Hence it should be clear that ‘much heavier
than’ is not a comparative. So Chang’s alleged counter-example doesn’t work against the
Collapsing Principle.
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that involves a comparison between its relata is relevant for what logical
principles hold for that relation. Take, for example, Broome’s claim that it
is necessary that comparative relations are transitive.10 Dyadic relations
of the form ‘a little bit more F than’ involve comparisons between their
relata and are clearly non-transitive. Comparatives, in the linguistic sense,
of the form ‘more F than’ are more plausibly transitive, however.11
Perhaps Elson’s ‘settaller than’ example could, with some changes, be
turned into a proper counter-example to the Collapsing Principle. To
attempt this kind of x, we need to rst dene a monadic predicate ‘settall’
and then form a comparative of this predicate. The challenge is to nd a
denition of ‘settall’ which has a comparative that would support Elson’s
line of argument. One suggestion for ‘settall’ could be
(4) Set X is settall =df set X contains many tall men.
Perhaps ‘contains many tall men’ is not a predicate that allows for compar-
ative grades, since ‘more contains many tall men’ is ungrammatical. One
might suggest that a comparative relation corresponding to (4) could be
(5) Set X is settaller than set Y =df set X contains to a greater extent
many tall men than set Y .
Nevertheless, insofar as ‘B contains to a greater extent of many tall men
than A’ can be given a clear meaning, its being true doesn’t seem to
logically entail its being true that B contains more tall men than A, since
‘to a greater extent’ modies ‘contains’ rather than ‘many’. The addition
of the borderline tall Tallish in B to the tall men in A doesn’t make it (i)
clearly true that B contains more tall men than A, but it might arguably
make it (ii) clearly true that B contains to a greater extent many tall
men than A. Elson’s argument needs (i), but only (ii) follows from the
Collapsing Principle.
A better way to revise the example is to use the predicate ‘populous’
and the comparative ‘more populous than’. We can then revise Elson’s
example as follows:12
A is a country of ten million inhabitants.
B is a country of ten million inhabitants and one borderline inhabi-
tant living on the border (call her ‘Borderline’).
C is a country of ten million and one inhabitants.
10 Broome,Weighing Lives, p. 50.
11 Broome,Weighing Lives, pp. 50–63, provides an extended defence of comparative
relations’ being necessarily transitive against several alleged counter-examples.
12 I thank Erik Carlson for suggesting this revision.
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Since it seems false that A is more populous than B and not false that
B is more populous than A, the Collapsing Principle entails that B is
more populous than A. Like before, one might then argue that, since
A has ten million inhabitants and B is more populous than A, B must
have more than ten million inhabitants. So Borderline is an inhabitant
of B. And, since it seems false that B is more populous than C and not
false that C is more populous than B, the Collapsing Principle entails that
C is more populous than B. Again, one might then argue that, since C
is more populous than B and C has ten million and one inhabitants, B
cannot have more than ten million inhabitants. Hence Borderline is not
an inhabitant of B, and we have a contradiction.
This revised line of argument against the Collapsing Principle is more
compelling, but much the same objections apply. This revised example, I
shall argue, only illustrates that the Collapsing Principle is implausible,
not that it entails contradictions. It seems plausible that, if it’s clearly true
that B is more populous than A, it’s also clearly true that B contains more
inhabitants than A. While I agree that this claim is plausible, I think one
could reject it without contradiction. One might claim that, even if it’s
clearly true that B is more populous than A, it still isn’t clearly true that B
contains more inhabitants than A. This could hold if populousness comes
in ner degrees than the addition of one person, for example, the addition
of one borderline person. The revised line of argument doesn’t show that
this idea is contradictory. If populousness comes in ner degrees in this
manner, we can reject the inference from that B is more populous than A
to that B contains more inhabitants than A and the inference from that
C is more populous than B to that C contains more inhabitants than B.
And, if these inferences are invalid, then this revised line of argument
doesn’t show that the Collapsing Principle yields contradictions if there
are borderline cases.
2. Large Holiday Destinations
Let’s turn to Elson’s second alleged counter-example, which he claims
is a version of the same general counter-example as the rst.13 As we
shall see, however, the second example diers in structure from the rst.
Unlike the rst example, the second example concerns a comparative
relation, namely, ‘better as a holiday destination’. Hence my objection to
the ‘settaller than’ example does not apply.
Suppose that Elson prefers visiting large countries and, accordingly,
that being a large country is a good-making feature of holiday destinations.
And suppose that China, Ireland, and France are equally good as holiday
13 Elson, ‘Borderline Cases’, pp. 56–57.
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destinations in all relevant respects except size but that China is clearly
large, Ireland is clearly not large, and France is borderline large. Elson’s
argument is divided into two rounds; the rst concerns the comparison
between Ireland and France.
Round 1. It is false that Ireland is better than France (since ‘Ireland
is large and France is not’ is false), but not false that France is
better than Ireland (since ‘France is large and Ireland is not’ is
borderline). By the collapsing principle, it is true that France is
better than Ireland. Given my preferences, it must be true that
France is a large country. It could not have been borderline large
aer all.14
To reach the conclusion that France is a large country, Elson assumes that
(6) If countries x and y are equally good as holiday destinations in all
relevant respects except size and x is better as a holiday destination
than y, then x is large and y is not large.
The second round concerns the comparison between France and China.
Round 2. It is false that France is better than China, and not false
that China is better than France. Therefore, it is true that China
is better than France. Given my preferences, it must be false that
France is a large country. It could not have been borderline large
aer all.
Contradiction.15
Like in the rst round, Elson assumes (6) to derive the second conjunct in
the contradiction that it’s true and also false that France is a large country.
Having reached this contradiction, we are only forced to give up one
of the assumptions. But, rather than giving up the Collapsing Principle,
we could give up (6). Instead of (6), one might, for example, accept the
following weaker claim:
(7) If countries x and y are equally good as holiday destinations in all
relevant respects except size and x is better as a holiday destination
than y, then
• x is large and y is not large, or
• x is large and y is borderline large, or
• x is borderline large and y is not large.
14 Elson, ‘Borderline Cases’, p. 57.
15 Elson, ‘Borderline Cases’, p. 57.
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If we accept (7) rather than (6), we can avoid the contradiction in the
second example even if the Collapsing Principle holds, since we then
block the conclusion that it’s true that France is large and also the contrary
conclusion that it’s false.
One might object that one could just stipulate that (6) holds as a part
of the example’s set-up. But then the above objection could instead be
levelled against the plausibility of the example. The contradiction only
follows from the Collapsing Principle given (6), so we can still maintain
that the Collapsing Principle doesn’t yield contradictions as long as we
can deny the plausibility of (6).
Hence neither of Elson’s alleged counter-examples to the Collaps-
ing Principle shows that the principle yields contradictions if there are
borderline cases.
3. The Balding Cavalier
If we removed the attempt to derive a contradiction from the Collapsing
Principle, Elson’s second example would be similar to a more straightfor-
ward counter-example.
The Balding Cavalier
Suppose that A and B are two prospective cavaliers, identical in
every relevant aspect except that it’s indeterminatewhether B is bald
but clear thatA is not bald. And suppose that, for supercial reasons,
baldness contributes negatively to one’s goodness as a cavalier. Then,
surely, B is not better than A. But, since it’s indeterminate whether
B is bald, it’s indeterminate whether B diers from A in any relevant
respect that contributes negatively to B’s goodness. Thus it should
be indeterminate whether A is better than B.16
16 Johan E. Gustafsson, Preference and Choice (PhD dissertation, Royal Institute of
Technology, 2011), at p. 26, and ‘Indeterminacy’, at p. 436. Henrik Andersson, How It All
Relates: Exploring the Space of Value Comparisons (PhD dissertation, Lund University,
2017), p. 92, points out the similarity between Elson’s second example and the Bald-
ing Cavalier. The Balding Cavalier is a variation of the following kind of example by
Erik Carlson, ‘Broome’s Argument against Value Incomparability’, Utilitas 16 (2004),
pp. 220–224, p. 224:
suppose that A and B are two identical alarm clocks, except that A is
waterproof, and B is not. Is A a better alarm clock than B? There may be
no denite answer, since it may be indeterminate whether water resistance
is a good-making characteristic of artefacts that are not very likely to come
into contact with water. It is clear, however, that B is not better than A,
since A’s being waterproof denitely does not detract from its goodness as
an alarm clock.
Carlson’s example, however, relies on its being indeterminate which feature are good
making. Broome, ‘Reply to Rabinowicz’, p. 417, objects that it couldn’t be indeterminate
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Here, the charge against the Collapsing Principle isn’t that it yields con-
tradictions but merely that it does not t with this seemingly plausible
story.
Erik Carlson suggests that one might resist this counter-example if
one relies on the following monadic variant of the Collapsing Principle:
The Monadic Collapsing Principle
For any x and y, if it is false that y is F and not false that x
is F, then it is true that x is Fer than y.17
To be at all plausible, the Monadic Collapsing Principle should be re-
stricted to gradable predicates F that predicate a plain degree of Fness.18
The idea is that, if it’s false that A is bald and not false that B is bald, then
B must be balder than A, contradicting the above story.
Nevertheless, the Monadic Collapsing Principle seems to be open to
similar counter-examples as the (dyadic) Collapsing Principle. Carlson
oers the following variation of the Balding Cavalier:
Let us slightly modify Gustafsson’s cavalier case, and assume that
B is denitely bald, whereas A is a borderline case of baldness. In
all other relevant respects, the two cavaliers are identical. Suppose
also that, given their other properties, not being bald is necessary
and sucient for A or B to qualify as a good cavalier. It is thus false
that B is good, and indeterminate whether A is good. The monadic
collapsing principle then implies that A is denitely better than B.
But this seems false, since it is indeterminate whether A lacks the
property, viz. baldness, whose absence would constitute the only
relevant dierence, as compared to B.19
This variation seems to rely on the same kind of intuition as the Balding
Cavalier. Hence theMonadic Collapsing Principle conicts with the same
kind of counter-examples as the (dyadic) Collapsing Principle. It seems,
therefore, point-assuming to rely on the Monadic Collapsing Principle
in a defence of the (dyadic) Collapsing Principle from these counter-
examples.
Henrik Andersson tries to defend the Monadic Collapsing Principle
from this objection. He discusses a dierent yet analogous case, where
whether a certain feature contributes to the value of an item. This objection does not
apply to the Balding Cavalier.
17 Erik Carlson, ‘Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle’, Ethical
Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2013), pp. 449–463, at p. 454.
18Here, I follow the terminology of Huddleston and Pullum, The Cambridge Gram-
mar, p. 1162n39; plain degree has traditionally been called ‘positive degree’.
19 Carlson, ‘Vagueness’, pp. 454–455.
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Alf and Beth are identical in all relevant aspects except that [. . .]
Beth is narrow-minded and it is indeterminate whether Alf is
narrow-minded. Because of this, for Alf and Beth, given the other
properties they possess, not being narrow-minded is a necessary
and sucient condition to qualify as a good philosopher.20
Andersson objects that
Carlson is mistaken in that the only relevant dierence between Alf
and Beth is that it is indeterminate whether Alf is narrow-minded
while it is determinate that Beth is not. Since it is indeterminate
whether Alf is narrow-minded it is also not false that Alf is not
narrow-minded. And since it is false that Beth is not narrow-minded
it must, in accordance with the monadic collapsing principle, be
true that Alf is more not narrow-minded than Beth, or more natu-
rally: Beth is more narrow-minded than Alf.21
Andersson’s objection is, I think, unconvincing. First, it is point-assuming
to defend theMonadic Collapsing Principle with the help of that principle,
or to rely on the same kind of inference.22 Second, Alf ’s being more not
narrow-minded than Beth isn’t equivalent to Beth’s being more narrow-
minded than Alf. In the former, ‘more’ modies the predicate ‘not narrow-
minded’, which seems to require that negations allow degrees. All we get
is that Beth is not narrow-minded to a lesser degree than Alf. Without
further assumptions, we cannot derive that Beth is more narrow-minded
than Alf.
In conclusion, Elson’s rst example doesn’t work, since—as dened—
‘settaller than’ is not a comparative. And the ‘more populous’ revision and
Elson’s second example need some further assumptions, which can be con-
sistently rejected. Hence these examples do not show that the Collapsing
Principle yields contradictions if there are borderline cases. The Balding
Cavalier is a less ambitious counter-example—it only tries to show that
the Collapsing Principle is implausible. But, as I have argued, this less
ambitious example is cogent. The upshot is that, while the Collapsing
Principle is implausible, it doesn’t seem to rule out borderline cases.23
johan.eric.gustafsson@gmail.com
20 Henrik Andersson, ‘Propping Up the Collapsing Principle’, Ethical Theory and
Moral Practice 18 (2014), pp. 475–486, at pp. 482–483.
21 Andersson, ‘Propping Up’, p. 483.
22 I thank Erik Carlson for this point.
23 I wish to thank Henrik Andersson, Krister Bykvist, Erik Carlson, Luke Elson,
Christopher Jay, Cristian Piller, Mozaar Qizilbash, and two anonymous referees for
valuable comments.
